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PROGRAMMABLE ELECTRONIC MINING SYSTEMS:
BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS
(In Nine Parts)
Part 6:   5.1  System Safety Guidance
By John J. Sammarco, Ph.D., P.E.1
ABSTRACT
This report (System Safety Guidance 5.1) is the sixth in a nine-part series of
recommendations and guidance addressing the functional safety of processor-controlled mining
equipment.  It is part of a risk-based system safety process encompassing hardware, software,
humans, and the operating environment for the equipment’s life cycle.  Figure 1 shows a safety
framework containing these recommendations.  The reports in this series address the various life
cycle stages of inception, design, approval and certification, commissioning, operation, maintenance,
and decommissioning.  These recommendations were developed as a joint project between the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and Health
Administration.  They are intended for use by mining companies, original equipment manufacturers,
and aftermarket suppliers to these mining companies.  Users of these reports are expected to
consider the set in total during the design cycle.
•  1.0  Safety Introduction (Part 1).—This is an introductory report for the general mining
industry.  It provides basic system/software safety concepts, discusses the need for mining to address
the functional safety of programmable electronics (PE), and includes the benefits of implementing
a system/software safety program.
•  2.1  System Safety (Part 2) and 2.2 Software Safety (Part 3).—These reports draw heavily
from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a,b,c,d,e,f,g]
and other standards.  The scope is “surface and underground safety-related mining systems
employing embedded, networked, and nonnetworked programmable electronics.”  System safety
seeks to design safety into all phases of the entire system.  Software is a subsystem; thus, software
safety is a part of the system’s safety.
•  3.0  Safety File (Part 4).—This report contains the documentation that demonstrates the
level of safety built into the system and identifies limitations for the system’s use and operation.
In essence, it is a “proof of safety” that the system and its operation meet the appropriate level of
safety for the intended application.  It starts from the beginning of the design, is maintained during
the full life cycle of the system, and provides administrative support for the safety program of the
full system.
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Figure 1.—The safety framework and associated guidance.
•  4.0  Safety Assessment (Part 5).—The independent assessment of the safety file is
addressed.  It establishes consistent methods to determine the completeness and suitability of safety
evidence and justifications.  This assessment could be conducted by an independent third party.
•  Safety Framework Guidance.—It is intended to supplement the safety framework reports
with guidance providing users with additional information.  The purpose is to assist users in
applying the concepts presented.  In other words, the safety framework is what needs to be done and
the guidance is how it can be done.  The guidance information reinforces the concepts, describes
various methodologies that can be used, and gives examples and references.  It also gives
information on the benefits and drawbacks of various methodologies.  The guidance reports are not
intended to promote a single methodology or to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject material.
They provide information and references so that the user can more intelligently choose and
implement the appropriate methodologies given the user’s application and capabilities.  The
guidance reports comprise parts 6 through 9 of the series and are listed below:
<  5.1  System Safety Guidance (Part 6).—This guidance supplements 2.1  System Safety.
<   5.2  Software Safety Guidance (Part 7).—This guidance supplements 2.2  Software Safety.
<  6.0  Safety File Guidance (Part 8).—This guidance supplements 3.0  Safety File.
<  7.0  Independent Functional Safety Assessment Guidance (Part 9).—This guidance
  supplements 4.0  Independent Functional Safety Assessment.
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BACKGROUND
The mining industry is using programmable electronics (PE) technology to improve safety, increase
productivity, and improve mining’s competitive position.  It is an emerging technology for mining
that is growing in diverse areas, including longwall mining systems, automated haulage, mine
monitoring systems, and mine processing equipment.  Although PE provides many benefits, it adds
a level of complexity that, if not properly considered, may adversely affect worker safety [Sammarco
et al. 1997].  This emerging technology can create new hazards or worsen existing ones.
PE technology has unique failure modes that are different from mechanical systems or hard-wired
electronic systems traditionally used in mining.
The use of a safety life cycle helps to ensure that safety is applied in a systematic manner for all
phases of the system, thus reducing the potential for systematic errors.  It enables safety to be
“designed in” early rather than being addressed after the system’s design is completed.  Early
identification of hazards makes it easier and less costly to address them.  The life cycle concept is
applied during the entire life of the system since hazards can become evident at later stages or new
hazards can be introduced by system modifications.  The safety life cycle for mining is an adaptation
of the safety life cycle in part 1 of IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a].
System safety activities include identifying hazards, analyzing the risks, designing to eliminate or
reduce hazards, and using this approach over the entire system life cycle.  These system safety
activities start at the system level and flow down to the subsystems and components.  More detailed
information on the fundamentals of system safety is presented by Sammarco et al. [2001].
Additional resources for PE safety are given in Appendix A.
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 The Safety Life Cycle
The safety life cycle is a core concept throughout the System Safety document 2.1 [Sammarco and
Fisher 2001].  Section 5.0 of that document gives an overview of the safety life cycle.  The various
life cycle phases are listed and briefly described in Table 1 below.
Table 1.—Safety life cycle overview
(adapted from IEC [1998a])
Life cycle phase Objectives
  1.  Define scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To determine the boundaries for the PE system and to bound the hazard and risk
   analysis.
  2.  Hazards and risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . To identify and analyze hazards, event sequences leading to hazards, and the risk
   of hazardous events.
  3.  Overall safety requirements . . . . . . . . . . To specify the safety functions and associated safety integrity for the safety
   system(s).
  4.  Designate safety-critical areas . . . . . . . To assign safety functions to various PE-based and non-PE-based safety systems
   and protection layers.  To assign safety integrity levels (SILs).
  5.  Operation and maintenance plan . . . . . To plan how to operate, maintain, and repair the PE-based safety system to
   ensure functional safety.
  6.  Safety validation plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To plan how to validate that the PE-based safety system meets the safety
   requirements.
  7.  Installation and commissioning plan . . . To plan how to install and commission the PE-based safety system in a safe
   manner and to ensure that functional safety is achieved.
  8.  Management of change plan . . . . . . . . . To plan how to ensure that changes will not adversely impact functional safety.
   To plan how to systematically make and track changes.
  9.  Design for safety systems . . . . . . . . . . . To design and create the PE-based safety system.  To follow safety practices for
   the PE-based safety system and the basic system design.
10.  Additional safety technology . . . . . . . . . As needed; not within the scope of this report.
11.  External risk reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As needed; not within the scope of this report.
12.  Install and commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . To install and commission the safety system properly and safely.
13.  Validate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To carry out the safety validation plan.
14.  Operate and maintain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To operate, maintain, and repair the PE-based safety system so that functional
   safety is maintained.
15.  Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To make all modifications in accordance with the management of change plan.
16.  Decommission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To ensure the appropriate functional safety during and after decommissioning.
1.2 Scope
1.2.1 Surface and underground mining systems using PE for control or monitoring of safety-
critical mining systems and functions are within the scope.  It is not intended to apply to handheld
instruments; however, many of these principles would be useful in designing and assessing this
equipment.
1.2.2 Systems, protection layers, and devices using PE that are associated with the system are
within the scope.  These include—
•  Mining control and monitoring systems (MCMSs) using PE
•  Safety instrumented systems (SISs)
•  Critical alarms
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1.3 General
1.3.1 This guidance does not supersede federal or state laws and regulations.
1.3.2 This guidance is not equipment- or application-specific.
1.3.3 This guidance is informative; it does not serve as a compliance document.
1.3.4 This guidance applies to the entire life cycle for the mining system.
1.3.5 This guidance applies mainly to the safety-related parts of the system.  However, the
guidance can also be applied to the basic system.
2.0 Key Documents
2.1 This guidance document is based on information and concepts from the recommendation
documents Introduction 1.0 [Sammarco et al. 2001] and System Safety 2.1 [Sammarco and Fisher
2001].
3.0 Definitions
The definitions are directly from IEC 61508, part 4 [IEC 1998d].  Some definitions are adaptations
or newly formed definitions specific to mining.
Channel – Components or subsystems operating together to perform a function.  Components and
subsystems within a channel include input/output modules, logic systems, sensors, power systems,
and final elements.
Common Cause Failure – A failure resulting from one or more events, causing coincident failure
of two or more channels of a multichannel system, thus leading to system failure.
Dangerous Failure – A failure having the potential to put the safety-related system in a dangerous
or fail-to-function state.  A dangerous failure has the potential to result in harm.
Dangerous Failure Detected – A failure detected by diagnostic tests such that the system will be
placed into a safe state.
Dangerous Failure Undetected – A failure not detected by diagnostic tests such that the system
has the potential to result in harm.
NOTE 1: The probability of a dangerous failure is 8D; the probability of a dangerous failure detected is 8DD;
the probability of a dangerous failure undetected is 8DU.
Diagnostic Coverage – The fractional decrease in the probability of dangerous hardware failure
resulting from the successful operation of the automatic diagnostic tests.
7
NOTE 2: The definition may also be represented in terms of the following equation:
                                                                                                                                                       (1)
where DC is the diagnostic coverage,
 8DD is the probability of detected dangerous failures,
and  8total is the probability of total dangerous failures.
NOTE 3: Diagnostic coverage may exist for the whole or parts of a safety-related system.  For example, diagnostic
coverage may exist for sensors and/or logic system and/or final elements.
NOTE 4: The term “safe diagnostic coverage” is used to describe the decrease in the probability of safe hardware
failures resulting from the operation of the automatic diagnostic tests.
Dual Channel – Two channels that independently perform the same function.
Error – A discrepancy between a computed, observed, or measured value or condition and the true,
specified, or theoretically correct value or condition.
Failure – The termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function.
Fault – An abnormal condition or state that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of
a functional unit to perform a required function.
NOTE 5: A “failure” is an event.
NOTE 6: A “fault” is a state.  Faults are random or systematic.
Field Devices – Field devices include sensors, transmitters, operator interface devices (e.g., displays,
control panels, pendant controllers), actuators, wiring, and connectors.  Field devices are peripheral
devices hard-wired or connected by a wireless link to the input/output terminals of a logic system.
Hazard – Environmental or physical condition that can cause injury to people, property, or the
environment.
Human-Machine Interface – The physical controls, input devices, information displays, or other
media through which a human operator interacts with a machine for the purpose of operating the
machine.
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) – The expected average time between failures of a
repairable system where MTBF ' MTTF % MTTR.
Mean Time to Fail (MTTF) – The expected time that a system will operate before the first failure










Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) – The average value of the time to detect and identify a failure plus
the time to repair the failure.
Mining Control and/or Monitoring System (MCMS) – A system using programmable electronics
(PE), that responds to input signals from the equipment under control and/or from an operator and
generates output signals, causing the equipment under control to operate in the desired manner.
Mishap – An unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, injury, occupational illness, or
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment.  In the real world,
complete freedom from adverse events is not possible.  Therefore, the goal is to attain an acceptable
level of safety.
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) – A value that indicates the probability of a system
failing to respond on demand for a safety function.  The average probability of a system failing to
respond to a demand in a specified time interval is referred to as “PFDavg”.  PFD pertains to
dangerous failure modes.
Programmable Electronics (PE) – Refers to electronically programmable or configurable devices
(e.g., embedded controller, programmable logic controller, single-loop digital controller, distributed
control system controller) that are effectively the “brain” of a PE system.
Programmable Electronic System (PES) – Any system used to control, monitor, or protect
machinery, equipment, or a facility that has one or more programmable electronics (PE), including
all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways
and other communications paths, and actuators and other output devices.
Random Hardware Failure – A failure, occurring at a random time, that results from one or more
of the possible degradation mechanisms in the hardware.
NOTE 7: There are many degradation mechanisms occurring at different rates in different components.  Since
manufacturing tolerances cause components to fail due to these mechanisms after different times in operation, failures
of equipment comprising many components occur at predictable rates, but at unpredictable (i.e., random) times.
NOTE 8: A major distinguishing feature between random hardware failures and systematic failures is that system
failure rates (or other appropriate measures) arising from random hardware failures can be predicted with reasonable
accuracy, but systematic failures, by their very nature, cannot be accurately predicted.  That is, system failure rates
arising from random hardware failures can be quantified with reasonable accuracy, but those arising from systematic
failures cannot be accurately statistically quantified because the events leading to them cannot be easily predicted.
Risk – The combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and severity of that harm.
Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) – A measure of lowering the probability of an event from happening.
RRF ' inherent risk/acceptable risk, or RRF ' 1/PFD.
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Safe Failure – A failure that does not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a
dangerous or fail-to-function state.
NOTE 9: A safe failure is also known as a nuisance failure, false-trip failure, spurious failure, or fail-to-safe failure.
The probability of a safe failure is 8S.
Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) – A measure used for determining minimal redundancy levels where:
                                                                                                                          (2)
                       or
(3)
Safety – Freedom from unacceptable risk.
Safety Function – A function implemented by single or multiple MCMSs, protection layers, and
devices using PE intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for a specific hazardous event.
Safety Instrumented System (SIS) – System composed of sensors, logic solvers, and final control
elements for the purpose of taking the mining system to a safe state when predetermined conditions
are violated.  Other terms commonly used include “emergency shutdown system,” “safety shutdown
system,” and “safety interlock system.”
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) – One of three possible discrete integrity levels (SIL 1, SIL 2, SIL 3)
of safety instrumented functions.  SILs are defined by quantitative or qualitative methods.  SIL 3 has
the highest level of safety integrity (see Tables 2–3).
Table 2.—Assignment of SIL values for low-demand modes of operation
SIL







1 . . . . . . 10–1 to 10–2 10–     100         Method-dependent.
2 . . . . . . 10–2 to 10–3 100–  1,000         Method-dependent.
3 . . . . . . 10–3 to 10–4 1,000–10,000         Method-dependent.
Table 3.—Assignment of SIL values for high-demand (continuous) modes of operation
SIL







1 . . . . . 10–5 to 10–6 100,000–    1,000,000 Method-dependent.
2 . . . . . 10–6 to 10–7 1,000,000–  10,000,000 Method-dependent.




















NOTE 10: SILs apply to safety functions of systems, protection layers, and devices using PE.
NOTE 11: A low-demand mode of operation is when the safety-related system’s frequency of operation is less than
once per year or no greater than twice the frequency of tests (proof tests) to detect failures in the safety-related system.
A high-demand mode of operation is when the safety-related system’s frequency of operation is more than once per year
or greater than twice the frequency of tests (proof tests) to detect failures in the safety-related system.
Safety Life Cycle – The necessary activities involved in the implementation of safety-critical
systems.  The activities begin at the concept stage and cease after the systems’ decommissioning.
System – Set of elements that interact according to a design, where an element of a system can be
another system, called a subsystem, which may be a controlling system or a controlled system and
may include hardware, software, and human interaction. Hardware, software and humans can be
system elements.
Systematic Failure – A failure related to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a
modification of the design or of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation,
or other relevant factors.
NOTE 12: Corrective maintenance without modification will usually not eliminate the failure cause.
NOTE 13: A systematic failure can be induced by simulating the failure cause.
NOTE 14: Example causes of systematic failures include human error in the—
•   Safety requirements specification
•   Design, manufacture, installation, operation of the hardware
•   Design, implementation, etc., of the software
Subsystem – An element of a system.
Total Failures – The combination of all safe and dangerous failures where:
8total ' (E8S % G8D) (4)
Validation – The activity of demonstrating that the safety system under consideration, before or
after installation, meets in all respects the safety requirements specification for that safety system.
Verification – The activity of demonstrating for each phase of the relevant safety life cycle by
analysis and/or tests that, for the specific inputs, the deliverables meet in all respects the objectives
and requirements set for the specific phase.
4.0 Hazards and Risk Analysis
The objective of hazards and risk analysis is to identify and analyze hazards, the event sequences
leading to hazards, and the risk of hazardous events.  Many techniques, ranging from simple
qualitative methods to advanced quantitative methods, are available to help identify and analyze
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hazards.  The use of multiple hazard analysis techniques is recommended because each has its own
purpose, strengths, and weaknesses.
The System Safety Analysis Handbook [Stephans and Talso 1997] provides extensive listings and
descriptions of hazard analysis techniques.  Some of the more commonly used techniques include
preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), hazard and
operability studies (HAZOP), fault-tree analysis (FTA), and event-tree analysis (ETA).
4.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
Summary:  An analysis technique used in the early conceptual stages of design and development.
A sample PHA form is shown in Appendix C.
Discussion:  The PHA is frequently used early in the conceptual stages prior to design completion.
Typically, a team is used to identify potential hazards of the main system and possibly some of the
major subsystems.  It is used when there is limited information.  Therefore, it is a high-level analysis
and is not considered final.  The PHA output can include ranking of hazards, operational constraints,
recommended actions to eliminate or control the hazards, and perhaps additional safety
requirements.
A PHA can utilize information including the results of the preliminary hazard list, lessons learned,
system and component design data, safety design data, and malfunction data to identify potential
hazard areas.  PHA does not designate a specific technique; however, checklists and forms are
commonly used.
Advantages:
•  Useful at conceptual stages
•  Relatively quick to implement
Disadvantage:
•  Cannot be used to extensively identify and analyze hazards
Mastery:  Requires knowledge, experience, and understanding of the application.
4.2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Summary:  This analysis identifies failures of components, subsystems, and their effects on the
system.  In essence, it is a “bottom-up” approach starting with the system’s components. The
standard, Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis [U.S.
Department of Defense 1980], provides detailed information on FMEA.
Discussion:  This is a systematic technique to identify and analyze safety-critical components and
subsystems of a system.  FMEA is most effectively conducted during the design phase, thus enabling
system design modifications to eliminate critical components or subsystems.  Generally, the tabular
format or spreadsheet is used.  A sample FMEA form is shown in Appendix C.  Usually, the analysis
is conducted by a few engineers having a detailed understanding of the system and of the various
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failure modes for each component and subsystem.  Some typical failure modes of mechanical and
electronic components are as follows:
•  Failure to open or close
•  Failure to start or stop
•  Short- or open-circuit failure





The following are the basic steps to conduct an FMEA:
(1)  Identify the system’s components and subsystems
(2)  Determine all failure modes for each component and subsystem
(3)  Identify the consequences of each failure
(4)  Identify elimination or mitigation of failure
Advantages:
•  Analysis procedure is simple to understand
•  The FMEA tabular results are relatively easy to understand
•  Good for situations where a component failure has a major system level safety consequence
Disadvantages:
•  Does not identify common-cause failures
•  Does not identify multiple failure combinations
•  Human errors during operation and maintenance might be missed
•  Can be time-consuming for large, complex systems
Mastery:  The difficulty to understand the method is relatively low.
4.3 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
Summary:  A systematic and structured qualitative method of study conducted by a
multidisciplinary team.  Guide words are applied to various parameters to stimulate thinking
concerning possible deviations.  As a result of these deviations, potential hazards and causes are
identified.  Multiple sources provide detailed information about HAZOP [U.K. Ministry of Defence
1998a,b; Redmill et al. 1999].  A sample HAZOP form is shown in Appendix C.
Discussion:  HAZOP had its beginnings in the chemical process industry where guide words were
designated for process industry parameters such as flow and pressure.  HAZOP can be applied to
a system, subsystem, process, or procedure and also to hardware and software.  HAZOP can be
easier to implement at the later stages when designs are firm rather than at conceptual phases.  Thus,
it is also well suited for hazard identification and analysis of modifications during the management
of change (MOC) process.
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HAZOP has been extended for the hardware and software of programmable systems [U.K. Ministry
of Defence 1998a,b; Redmill et al. 1999].  Hardware and software include:
Hardware:
•  Analog hardware
•  Digital hardware
•  Communications
•  Electrohydraulic subsystems
•  Electromechanical subsystems
•  Miscellaneous hardware (e.g., wires, connectors)
Software:
•  Software data flow diagrams
•  Software state transition diagrams
•  Entity relationship diagrams
Guide words are extended with:  early, late, before, after.  Table 4 lists generic and extended guide
words, along with the guide word interpretations.  Guide words can be customized for the user’s
application and system.  The guide words are applied to system and subsystem attributes to identify
deviations from the design intent that might create a hazard.
Table 4.—HAZOP guide word interpretations
Guide word Standard interpretation PES interpretation
No . . . . . . . . . No part of the intention is achieved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No data or control signal passed.
More . . . . . . . A quantitative increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . More data is passed than intended.
Less . . . . . . . A quantitative decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Less data is passed than intended.
As well as . . . All design intent achieved, but with additional results Not used here because this is already covered by
   "more".
Part of . . . . . . Only some of the intention is achieved . . . . . . . . . . . . . The data or control signals are incomplete.
Reverse . . . . Covers reverse flow in pipes and reverse chemical
   reactions.
The logical opposite of intention.
Other than . . . A result other than the original intention is achieved . . The data or control signals are complete, but incorrect.
Early . . . . . . . Not used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The signal arrives too early with reference to clock time.
Late . . . . . . . . Not used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The signal arrives too late with reference to clock time.
Before . . . . . . Not used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The signal arrives earlier than intended within a
    sequence.
After . . . . . . . Not used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The signal arrives later than intended within a sequence.
The HAZOP should be applied throughout the safety life cycle.  Early in the life cycle, HAZOP
should be applied to block diagrams; as the design progresses, HAZOP should be applied to other
system representations, such as electrical schematic diagrams. Many different types of design
representations exist.  HAZOP can be applied to the following design representations:
•  Block diagrams (electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, etc.)
•  Schematic diagrams (electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, etc.)
•  State transition diagrams
•  Data flow diagrams
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•  Object-oriented diagrams
•  Timing diagrams
•  Operating instructions
•  Operating tasks
•  Maintenance tasks
HAZOP should also be applied at the subsystem levels.  This includes the electromechanical
subsystem, electrical communication subsystem, electronic hardware, and the software.  Table 5 lists
HAZOP guide words for electrical wiring [Redmill et al. 1999].
Table 5.—Example guide word interpretations for electric wiring
Guide word Example interpretation for electrical wiring
No . . . . . . . . . . Broken or missing wire or connection.
More . . . . . . . . Excessive voltage or current.
Less . . . . . . . . Undervoltage or current condition.
As well as . . . . Noise, interference, or EMI in addition to desired signals.
Part of . . . . . . . NA
Reverse . . . . . Circuit polarity is connected backwards or the opposite of the intention.
Other than . . . . Wrong wire or signal.
Early . . . . . . . . NA
Late . . . . . . . . . NA
Before . . . . . . . NA
After . . . . . . . . NA
NA    Not applicable.
HAZOP is a team-based, qualitative technique that uses guide words applied to parameters in order
to discover deviations from the intended design.  The team should be a multidisciplinary collection
of people from technical, organizational, and operational groups.  The people are typically highly
qualified by extensive knowledge and experience.  Typically, five or six persons are on the team.
A team might be composed of the following:
•  Team leader
•  Senior designer
•  Safety person
•  Operation and maintenance person
•  End user
•  Project manager
The length of time to conduct a HAZOP study depends on the size and complexity of the system.
For a small system, it may take a day of preparation and a few days to conduct the team sessions.
A large and complex system may take several days of preparation and a few weeks to conduct the
sessions.  It is important for the team leader to keep the team focused on the important safety topics
and sections and to help ensure that common sense and logic prevails.  It is very important that a
common pitfall to HAZOP be recognized and dealt with.  Often, the study can become quite lengthy,
causing the members to lose interest and commitment.  This can result if the team tries to go into
too much detail or tries to be too comprehensive.
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Advantages:
•  Very good track record of prior use and success
•  Can produce detailed and comprehensive results
•  Does not require extensive training or specialized tools
Disadvantages:
•  Can be time-consuming for large and complex systems
•  Best for short time periods of use because team members can lose effectiveness
Mastery:  The difficulty to understand the method is relatively low.
4.4 Fault-tree Analysis (FTA)
Summary:  A logical “top-down” method of structuring events and failures leading to a hazard.
The Fault-tree Handbook [Vesely et al. 1981] provides detailed information on FTA.
Discussion:  FTA is a logical method of deduction utilizing a graphical depiction of events, faults,
or logical combinations (Boolean expressions such as AND, OR, etc.) thereof.  It begins at the top
of the fault tree with an undesirable event.  Next, the possible events and logical combinations are
developed for the fault tree until the root causes are determined.  The root causes can be triggering
events or basic faults.  It is best to use fault trees on the major events because the trees can grow
quite large.  FTA can be applied to hardware and to operational modes of the system (i.e., startup,
operation, maintenance, and shutdown).
Fault trees are suited to analysis of static situations; thus, dynamic situations involving timing are
difficult to implement.  Also, fault trees can be qualitative or quantitative.  A quantitative fault tree
uses probabilities for the events and faults.  Finally, the traditional fault tree for the system hardware
has been extended to software fault-tree analysis.  This is best suited for analysis of the most critical
software at the module level of detail.
There is a standard set of graphical symbols to construct the tree.  Additional symbols are used for
special situations.  For example, “transfer in” and “transfer out” symbols are used to enable
transition between multiple pages of fault trees.  The basic symbols used to construct fault trees are
shown in Table 6.
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Table 6.—Basic fault-tree symbols
Event or fault
           
Basic event or fault
       
Incomplete event or fault
             
Inhibit gate
            
AND gate
           
OR gate
           
Trigger event
Advantages:
•  Identifies multiple failures
•  Identifies multiple events and sequences leading to a hazard
•  Identifies common causes
•  Provides valuable documentation to aid investigations of mishaps
•  Suitable for hardware or software
Disadvantages:
•  Can become time-consuming if trees grow very large
•  Not suited for timing (dynamic) situations
Mastery:  Requires a moderate degree of training and skill to construct qualitative trees; quantitative
FTA requires additional training in probability and cut sets.
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Figure 2.—A basic event tree.
4.5 Event-tree Analysis (ETA)
Summary:  A logical, bottom-up graphical technique to determine outcomes from a single initiating
hazardous event.
Discussion:  The event tree is useful for determining the probability of each unwanted outcome
resulting from a single initiating event.  From this, one can determine which outcomes are the most
severe or occur with the greatest frequency.  Figure 2 depicts a simple event tree.  The event tree
starts with a single initiating event, a severed hydraulic line, and a frequency of event occurrence
of .01 events per year (i.e., once every 100 years).  The safety control measures associated with the
system are used as headings across the top of the tree.  The initiating event is then sequenced
through the event tree with the associated control measures.  Each control measure has two
paths—operate or fail.  Probabilities are determined for each of these paths.
Advantages:
•  Well suited for single events with multiple outcomes
•  Suited for high risks not amenable to simpler analysis methods
Disadvantages:
•  Trees can grow large very quickly
•  Probabilities may be difficult to estimate
•  Can be extremely time-consuming
Mastery:  ETA is one of the more demanding analysis methods. 
18
4.6 Potential or Predictive Human Error Analysis
Summary:  A team-based method similar in concept to HAZOP; however, this analysis focuses on
human tasks and the associated error potential [Center for Chemical Process Safety 1994].
Discussion:  Human error causes fall into the following basic categories:
•  Complexity – increases the likelihood of error
•  Stress – increases the likelihood of error
•  Fatigue – increases the likelihood of error
•  Environment – adverse environments increase the likelihood of error
•  Training – better training reduces the likelihood of error
The members of the team conducting the analysis should consider these error causes as they conduct
the analysis.  The basic procedure is as follows:
•  Identify key human tasks
•  Apply the following guide words for each task:
<  Action omitted
<  Incomplete action
<  Incorrect action timing
<  Wrong action
<  Wrong action sequence
<  Wrong selection
<  Action applied to the wrong interface object
A worksheet can be used to document the results.  It should include the following information:
•  Task
•  Error guide word(s)
•  Description
•  Error consequence
•  Strategy to prevent or reduce the error consequence
Advantages:
•  The method can identify many potential errors
•  Validation studies show that a high portion of errors can be identified by thorough application
of the method
Disadvantages:
•  Can be time-consuming if many tasks and actions exist
•  Effectiveness depends on the team’s expertise and effort
Mastery:  Requires a high level of team expertise concerning the system.
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4.7 Operating and Support Analysis (O&SA)
Summary:  Operating and Support Analysis seeks to identify hazards during operation and
maintenance, find the root causes, determine the acceptable level of risk, and recommend risk
reductions [Harms-Ringdahl 1993].
Discussion:  An understanding of the operations, environment, and support (maintenance)
philosophy (i.e., training, implementation, etc.) that will be part of the mining process needs to be
analyzed.  The Operating and Support Analysis (O&SA) is used to identify hazards that may occur.
The O&SA is conducted by a team familiar with the system’s operation and interaction with
humans.  Some of the items to be considered include:
•  Operating during normal and abnormal conditions
•  Making changes to the system
•  Maintaining the equipment and software
•  Testing of the systems
•  Training personnel on the use and maintenance of the systems
•  Providing adequate documentation for the systems
Advantages:
•  Provides hazard identification in the context of the entire system operation
Disadvantages:
•  Requires a high level of expertise concerning the system
Mastery:  Requires a high level of expertise concerning the system
4.8 Action-Error Analysis (AEA)
Summary:  Action-error analysis (AEA) is used to identify operator errors and the subsequent
consequences.  AEA specifically focuses on the interactions between humans and the system during
operation, maintenance, and testing [Harms-Ringdahl 1993].
Discussion:  The basic procedure is outlined as follows for operation and maintenance tasks:
•  Identify operator tasks
•  Detail the subtasks and actions for each task
•  For each action, identify potential operator errors and consequences.  As a guide, the following
error types are considered for each action:
<  Error of omission (action not taken)
<  Wrong sequence of actions
<  Temporal errors (actions taken late or early)
<  Incorrect actions taken
<  Actions applied to the wrong interface object
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Advantages:
•  Well suited for automated or semiautomated processes with operator interfaces
Disadvantages:
•  Requires a high level of expertise concerning the system
Mastery:  Requires a high level of expertise concerning the system
4.9 Interface Analysis
Summary:  Interface analysis is used to identify hazards resulting from physical, functional, logical,
and temporal interface incompatibilities.
Discussion:  Interface analysis is applicable to all systems and interfaces.  Numerous interfaces exist
such as human-machine, hardware-software, hardware-hardware, and system-environment.  The
types of interface incompatibilities include:
•  Environmental (temperature, moisture, dust, and vibration)
•  Electrical (EMI, power sources, supply voltages, and data signals)
•  Physical (rate and range of movement)
•  Logical (conditional responses based on Boolean expressions)
•  Temporal (clock times, response times, and delay times)
Incompatibilities can exist between adjacent, interconnected, interdependent, or interacting system
elements.
Advantages:
•  Applicable to all systems
•  Applicable to all types of interfaces
•  Applicable at the subsystem to the component level
Disadvantages:
•  Difficult to apply to large or complex systems
•  Difficult to find all types of interface incompatibilities for every operation
Mastery:  Requires a high level of expertise in diverse areas.
4.10 Sequentially Timed Events Plot (STEP) Investigation System
Summary:  STEP is an event-driven approach to define systems, analyze operation, and investigate
mishaps.
Discussion:  STEP is an analytical approach that graphically depicts sequentially timed events.
Events are defined with formatted “building blocks” composed of an “actor and action.”  The event
blocks are sequentially linked to graphically depict the flow of events that produce an outcome.  The
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graphical depiction is useful for analyzing and defining events for a given system.  STEP analysis
can help discover and analyze problems; the analysis is also useful for assessing mitigation options.
STEP is also used to analyze the types and sequences of events that lead to an incident.
Advantages:
•  Can be applied to define and systematically analyze complex systems or processes
•  Facilitates focus group analysis
Disadvantages:
•  Perceived as complicated and expensive to implement
Mastery:  Requires the ability to translate a system into a sequence of interrelated events.  Requires
good visualization and deductive logic skills.
5.0 Risk Assessment and Safety Integrity Level Determination
Once a hazard or hazardous event is identified and analyzed, the next step is to determine the
associated risk.  The level of risk is used to determine which hazards have an unacceptable risk and
which have acceptable risks.  Once the risks are identified, the safety performance or degree of
safety to mitigate risk is determined.  The safety performance is quantified by assignment of a level
1, 2, or 3, where 3 is the highest degree of safety performance.  These levels are called safety
integrity levels (SILs).
It is important to understand that the SIL specifies the safety performance of a safety-related system
function to reduce a given risk to an acceptable level.
NOTE 15: For example, a machine has a moving part that is controlled by a PES.  There is pinching hazard associated
with the part’s movement.  It is determined that there is a low, but unacceptable level of risk for this hazard and that a
safety function is needed to mitigate this risk.  The safety function’s safety performance is determined to be an SIL 1.
Risk assessment systematically enables the “ranking” of risks such that efforts can be focused to
eliminate risks or reduce the risks to an acceptable level.  Some risks might be classified as
acceptable because they are insignificant or deemed to be at a level that is reasonably practical to
assume.  For example, not every single risk associated with driving a car is eliminated, yet most of
us are willing to accept these risks or we wouldn’t be driving cars.
Typically, risk is defined as the product of severity and frequency.  Qualitative and quantitative
methods are used to systematically assess risk.  These methods have advantages and disadvantages.
Qualitative risk assessment techniques are relatively simple to understand.  They are subjective and
the results may vary depending on the person or team of people conducting the risk assessment.
These variations result because of variations in experience, knowledge, expertise, and individual
perceptions of risk.  Quantitative risk assessment is a rigorous technique based on statistical data.
It requires highly trained and experienced people as well as large quantities of statistical data.  One
negative is that the data may not be available.  Secondly, the data that are available might not be an
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accurate representation for a mining application because it might not have been obtained for similar
conditions of dust, moisture, or vibration.
Some of the common qualitative and quantitative techniques are described next.  It is the user’s
responsibility to select the risk assessment technique that is suitable for the application and user’s
expertise.  The risk assessment focus is on safety; however, it is beneficial to consider other types
of risk because they may indirectly affect safety.  For example, risks to the equipment or mine can
indirectly affect the safety of those people that make the repairs.
5.1 Qualitative Techniques
Qualitative techniques are applicable when it is not feasible to quantify risk.  Common qualitative
techniques include the risk assessment matrix, hazardous event severity matrix, and the risk graph.
These techniques vary in terms of the type and detail of available information.  The risk assessment
matrix [U.S. Department of Defense 1993] is the simplest.  Risk is determined by using severity and
frequency.  The hazardous event severity matrix [IEC 1998f] is similar to the risk matrix, but it also
takes independent layers of protection into account (section 5.6.2 gives an example of a layers of
protection analysis).  The risk graph uses severity and frequency, but it takes two additional
parameters into account.
The risk matrix is quite similar to the hazardous event severity matrix.  This qualitative method
enables the determination of a risk index.  The safety integrity level (SIL) can be determined by
using the risk index.  For each hazard, this basic process is used:
•  Determine severity category
•  Determine frequency category
•  Determine the risk level
•  Relate the risk to the SIL
5.2 Severity Categories
Severity categories are defined to provide a qualitative measure of the worst credible accident
resulting from human error, environmental conditions, design inadequacies, procedural deficiencies,
and system, subsystem, or component failure.  Table 7 lists examples of several severity categories.
Table 7.—Broadly defined severity category examples
Category Broad definitions
Catastrophic . . . . Death, system loss, severe mine or environmental damage.
Critical . . . . . . . . Severe injury, severe occupational illness, major system damage, or major mine or environmental damage.
Marginal . . . . . . . Moderate injury, moderate occupational illness, minor system damage, or minor mine or environmental damage.
Negligible . . . . . . Minor injury, minor occupational illness, less than minor system damage, or less than minor mine or environ-
   mental damage.
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The severity categories in Table 7 are broad, encompassing severity with respect to personnel safety
and health as well as equipment, mine, and environmental damage.  The main focus of this document
is on personnel safety; therefore, the severity category examples in Table 8 are more definitive for
mining.
Table 8.—Severity category examples specific to mine safety
Category Example definitions for safety
Catastrophic . . . Death or multiple deaths.
Critical . . . . . . . Severe injury, permanent disability (partial or total).
Marginal . . . . . . Moderate injury, medical treatment, and lost workdays.
Negligible . . . . . Minor injury, first-aid treatment, and no lost workdays.
5.3 Frequency Categories
A quantitative frequency is generally not possible early in the design process or might not be known
at all.  A qualitative frequency may be derived from experience and evaluation of historical safety
data from similar systems.  Supporting rationale for assigning a mishap probability should be
documented in hazard analysis reports.  Table 9 lists examples of general frequency categories.
Table 9.—Frequency category examples
Category Specific individual item Frequency1
Frequent . . . . . . . Likely to occur frequently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Once per year.
Probable . . . . . . . Occurs several times in the life of an item . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Once in 5 years.
Occasional . . . . . Likely to occur sometime in the life of an item . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Once in 10 years.
Remote . . . . . . . . Unlikely, but possible to occur in the life of an item . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Once in 20 years.
Improbable . . . . . So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced . . . . . . Once in 50 years.
1For example purposes.
5.4 Risk Assessment Matrix
This matrix maps the risk index to an SIL.  The severity and frequency are determined for each
hazard and positioned on the risk assessment matrix in Table 10 to determine the risk index [U.S.
Department of Defense 1993].  Each cell of the matrix has a risk index and associated SIL.
Table 10.—Risk assessment matrix
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible
Frequent . . . . . . A  (SIL 3) A  (SIL 3) A  (SIL 3)  B  (SIL 2)
Probable . . . . . . A  (SIL 3) A  (SIL 3) B  (SIL 2)  C  (SIL 1)
Occasional . . . . A  (SIL 3) B  (SIL 2) B  (SIL 2)  C  (SIL 1)
Remote . . . . . . B  (SIL 2) C  (SIL 1) C  (SIL 1)  D  (no SIL)









Acceptable risk with management review and approval.
Acceptable risk without review or approval.
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Figure 3.—Risk graph.  (Source:  IEC [1998e])
For example, one particular hazard of a longwall shield is unexpected movement.  Using Table 10,
the risk index of this hazard is “A” given a hazard occurrence of occasional and a severity of
catastrophic.  This risk is unacceptable, and steps must be taken to eliminate or reduce the risk.  For
purposes of this example, we will assume the risk cannot be eliminated; therefore, a safety function
is needed to specifically address the unexpected movement hazard.  The safety function performance
must meet SIL 3 because SIL 3 is assigned to the “A” risk index in Table 10.
5.5 Risk Assessment Graph
Figure 3 depicts a sample risk assessment graph.  The risk parameters C, F, P, and W characterize
the risk according to extent of severity, period of exposure, avoiding danger, and frequency of the
unwanted occurrence taking place, respectively.  The risk graph uses four parameters to characterize
risk and then determine the SIL.  Variations of the risk graph exist.
The safety standards EN–954–1 [British Standards Institute 1997] and IEC 61508–5 [IEC 1998e]
depict variations of risk graphs, yet both use the basic concepts of qualitative estimates for risk in
terms of severity, exposure, and avoidance.
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5.5.1 Risk Parameters
C – Consequence (severity of injury)
CA :  Minor injury, first aid treatment, and no lost workdays
CB :  Moderate injury, medical treatment, and lost workdays
CC :  Severe injury, permanent disability (partial or total)
CD :  Death or multiple deaths
F – Frequency and period of exposure
FA :  Rarely to more often
FB :  Frequently to continuously
NOTE 16: This does not imply that this is for the same person.  It also applies to successive exposure to different
people.  The exposure period could be an average value based on the total time the system is used on an annual basis.
P – Possibility of avoiding danger
PA :  Possible under certain conditions
PB :  Almost impossible
NOTE 17: The possibility of avoidance depends on a few key points:   if the hazard can be recognized, if the person
can react to avoid the consequence(s), if safe intervention by the person or others can take place.  The following factors
influence the possibility of avoidance:
•  Speed at which consequences occur
•  Degree of difficulty to avoid or intervene
•  Factors for detection:  ambient noise levels, lighting levels, presence/absence of audible/visible alarms
•  Degree of awareness (i.e., watch mode, low-concentration mode, high-concentration mode)
W – Frequency of the unwanted occurrence taking place
W1 :  Very slight
W2 :  Slight
W3 :  Relatively high
5.6 Semiquantitative Technique: Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
LOPA is a semiquantitative technique of risk assessment used when multiple protection layers serve
to reduce a risk to an acceptable level.  Typically, the consequences are determined qualitatively,
and the frequency or likelihood is determined quantitatively.
LOPA is helpful to determine if a safety requirement is adequately provided.  A safety requirement
specifies safety function and safety integrity, as shown in Figure 4.  A safety requirement can be
implemented by a single protection layer consisting of a single device or safety system.
Alternatively, it can be implemented using multiple protection layers.  The number and type of
protection layers depend on the design to meet the safety requirements.
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Figure 4.—Overall safety requirements.
Figure 5.—Example of protection layers for a mining system.
Figure 5 shows an example of protection layers for mining.  The protection layers could consist of
procedures, alarms, pressure relief devices, electrical protection devices, safety instrumented
systems, etc.  The layers can be passive or active; however, each protection layer should be
independent.  An independent protection layer’s (IPL) performance should not be affected by
another protection layer's failure.
5.6.1 LOPA Benefits
LOPA provides a more objective approach compared to purely qualitative techniques because the
frequency or likelihood is determined quantitatively.  LOPA enables more diversity and flexibility
in the design.  This can enable a design to potentially incorporate and account for existing protection
layers as long as they are independent.  Other potential benefits include:
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Figure 6.—Layer of protection graphical analysis.
•  Decreased subjectivity
•  Increased accuracy
•  Increased repeatability
•  Reduced cost
•  Simplicity as compared to purely quantitative techniques
5.6.2 Example 1:  Basic LOPA
LOPA is a graphical technique derived from the event tree.  One difference is that LOPA determines
only two outcomes:  an undesired outcome and outcome with no negative impact.  Figure 6 shows
a basic LOPA tree with these outcomes.
An LOPA tree consists of three components:  a single initiating hazard scenario, multiple protection
layers, and two outcomes.  A hazard scenario is an unplanned event or series of events that leads to
an undesired consequence.  In the example shown in Figure 6, the loss of hydraulic pressure is an
undesired consequence.  The consequence is determined to be once every 2 years (i.e., F ' 0.5/year).
This hazard propagates through two IPLs and results in two outcomes.  The undesired impact event
has a frequency of 0.004/year.
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5.7 Quantitative Techniques
The SIL for a single safety function can be determined by calculating the PFDavg as:
PFDavg # Ft / Fnp , (5)
where PFDavg ' the average probability of failure on demand for a low-demand mode of
 operation,
Ft ' tolerable risk frequency,
and Fnp ' frequency of the hazard without the safety function;
NOTE 18: Annex C of part 5 of IEC 61508 defines Fnp as “the demand rate on the safety-related system” [IEC 1998e].
Once the PFDavg is calculated, it can then be related to an SIL for low demands of operation by using
Table 2.
5.7.1 Example 2:  SIL Calculation
Fatality data show that one fatality per year occurs because of unexpected machine movements.
This is a hazard that the XYZ Mining Machine Company will address.  This company has a 40%
market share for this particular type of mining machine, so the company estimated that 40% of the
yearly fatalities involve its machines.  This manufacturer has made a corporate decision to modify
the machine by adding a new emergency stop system whose sole function is to prevent these
fatalities.  Therefore, the demand rate on the emergency stop system is equal to the hazard rate of
the machine without the emergency stop system.  Therefore, Fnp ' (1 fatality per year) × (0.4 market
share (i.e., Fnp ' 0.4)). The company decided it would accept a risk frequency of .0003.  The PFDavg
is calculated by:
PFDavg # Ft / Fnp
PFDavg # .0003 / 0.4
PFDavg # .00075
The emergency stop function demand rate is low because the demand rate is equal to the hazard rate
Fnp ' 0.4/year.  By using Table 2, a PFDavg of .00075 equates to a safety integrity level of SIL 3.
Thus, the safety requirements of the emergency stop function will specify an SIL 3.  The emergency
stop system performance will need to meet the PFDavg requirements to attain SIL 3.
NOTE 19: This hypothetical example uses the quantitative technique of Annex C of part 5 of IEC 61508 [IEC 1998e].
Other quantitative methods are described by ISA–dTR84.0.02 [ISA 1998a,b,c,d,e].  This technical report presents three
quantitative methods:  (1) simplified equations, (2) fault-tree analysis, and (3) Markov modeling.
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6.0 Design Considerations
6.1 General Design Process
The general design process is integrated with the safety life cycle.  Figure 7 depicts such a simplified
integration.  The process begins with a hazard and risk analysis from the safety life cycle.  After the
SIL is determined, the conceptual design stage begins.  The conceptual design stage is where the
various design options are identified.  The options could include designs realized solely by
nonprogrammable hardware or designs combining programmable hardware and software.  Once an
initial conceptual design is chosen, the design’s SIL is determined.  If the SIL is not achieved, the
design is modified until the desired SIL is achieved.
6.2 Conceptual Design Overview
The conceptual design is part of the safety life cycle realization phase.  At this point, the initial
hazard and risk analyses are done, and safety requirements are written to define the safety functions
and the target SIL values.
Figure 7.—The general design process to attain the required SIL.
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The designer needs to consider many factors and design options.  These factors include component
failure rates, component technologies, hardware architectures, and testing strategies.  The conceptual
design process also includes evaluation of the design’s safety performance with respect to the target
SIL value, and the reliability.  If the safety and reliability are not sufficient, then the conceptual
design is changed; thus, it is an iterative process, as shown in Figure 8.
6.3 Technologies
The choice of technologies is the first decision the designer should make.  Numerous technologies
exist.  Traditionally, control and safety functions were hard-wired in mining systems.  More
recently, programmable electronic devices and systems are being used in mining.  Devices such as
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) have replaced relay-based logic for virtually all applications.
In general, the technology choices are:
•  Relays.—Relays are simple devices, and their failure modes and rates are well known and
predictable.  They are typically used to implement simple functions requiring just a few inputs and
outputs.  Typically, relays lack automatic diagnostic, so they are manually tested.
Figure 8.—The conceptual design process is an iterative part of the safety life cycle realization phase.
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Figure 9.—A redundant PLC architecture.
•  Solid-state devices.—These devices do not use software; thus, their flexibility is restricted.
Solid-state devices can incorporate limited diagnostic and testing features.  Some solid-state devices
have identifiable and predictable failure modes and behavior under fault conditions.
•  Programmable electronic devices.—Microprocessors and PLCs are in wide use.  These
systems use solid-state devices and software.  Programmable electronic systems are more flexible
and can offer more functionality than relays.  However, the failure modes are not predictable, and
failures (hardware or software) can be difficult to detect and diagnose.  On-line testing and
diagnostics are available.
6.4 Hardware Architectures
The hardware architecture encompasses sensors, logic solvers, and final elements.  For example,
Figure 9 shows a redundant architecture for a PLC as the logic solver.  This architecture is known
as a one-out-of-two (1oo2) architecture that provides tolerance for one fault.
Various other architectures are used to add fault tolerance capabilities, as shown in Table 11.  The
choice of which architecture to use depends on the required SIL and the desired nuisance trip rate
(mean time to fail safe (MTTFS)).
Increasing the redundancy does not always increase the safety performance.  Therefore, the choice
of architecture involves consideration of many factors such as the required SIL and other factors
such as MTTFS.  The following example stresses these considerations.
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Table 11.—Various voting architectures and the electrical representation of their voting functions
Architecture Electrical representation Comments
1oo1 No-fault tolerance.
1oo2 For deenergized to trip systems.  Reduces dangerous failures of
energized outputs.  Requires two dangerous failures for the system
to fail dangerous.
2oo2
For energized to trip systems.  Reduces safe failures of deenergized
outputs.
2oo3
Tolerates both safe and dangerous failures.
6.4.1 Example 3:  Architecture Impacts on Safety Performance
This example involves a simple, normally closed switch used for an emergency stop function.  If the
switch fails closed, it is a dangerous failure; if it fails open, it is a safe failure.  The safe-failure rate
(nuisance-trip rate) is .1, or once in 10 years.  The dangerous failure rate is the same rate; thus, there
is an equal probability of either failure mode.  Four architectures are considered for the switch:
1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, and 2oo3.  The dangerous failure rates for the architectures are shown in
Figure 10; the safe failure rates for the architectures are shown in Figure 11.
Increasing the redundancy from 1oo1 to 1oo2 did improve the safety performance as defined by the
dangerous fail rate; however, the safe failure rate increased, which increases the MTTFS and results
in more nuisance trips.  The 2oo2 configuration also increases the redundancy, but the dangerous
failure rate doubled.  Thus, adding redundancy does not always improve safety.
NOTE 20: A 2oo2 or dual-channel system is generally not suited for an emergency stop function.  For instance, if one
channel fails such that the output remains energized, then the output will remain energized regardless of the other
channel’s operation.
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Figure 10.—Dangerous failure rates for various switch architectures.
Figure 11.—Safe failure rates for various switch architectures.
6.4.2 SIL Constraints Due to Hardware Architecture
The architecture is a factor in the attainment of an SIL.  The highest SIL that can be claimed for a
given architecture is restricted.  IEC 61508 bases the highest SIL that can be claimed on the
following:
•  Amount of hardware fault tolerance
•  The safe failure fraction (SFF)
•  The type of device or subsystem.  Simple devices are type A; complex devices are type B.
NOTE 21: All possible failure modes are well known and can be completely determined for type-A devices.  The
behavior under fault conditions can be completely determined.  A relay is considered to be type A.  For type-B devices,
all failure modes are not completely known or the behavior under fault conditions cannot be completely determined.
Also, there is insufficient failure data from field experience to document the dangerous detected and undetected failure
rate.  A PLC is considered to be type B.
NOTE 22: The safe failure fraction is a ratio of safe and dangerous detected failures to the total failures.
The IEC 61508 architectural constraints for type A and type B are shown in Tables 12 and 13,
respectively.
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Table 12.—IEC 61508 hardware architectural constraints
for type-A safety-related subsystems
Safe failure fraction
(SFF)
Hardware fault tolerance 
0 1 2
<60% . . . . . . . . . . SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
60% to <90% . . . . SIL 2 SIL 3 exceeds SIL 3
90% to <99% . . . . SIL 3 exceeds SIL 3 exceeds SIL 3
$99% . . . . . . . . . . SIL 3 exceeds SIL 3 exceeds SIL 3
Table 13.—IEC 61508 hardware architectural constraints
for type-B safety-related subsystems
Safe failure fraction
(SFF)
Hardware fault tolerance 
0 1 2
<60% . . . . . . . . . . Not allowed SIL 1 SIL 2
60% to <90% . . . . SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
90% to <99% . . . . SIL 2 SIL 3 exceeds SIL 3
$99% . . . . . . . . . . SIL 3 exceeds SIL 3 exceeds SIL 3
6.4.3 Example 4:  IEC 61508 Hardware Architecture Constraints
This example is based on the 1oo2 PLC shown in Figure 9. The following parameters are known for
the 1oo2 PLC:
PFDavg ' .2 × 10&7   (SIL 3)
SFF ' 91%
Faults tolerated ' 1
Component type ' B
The 1oo2 PLC meets SIL 2 based solely on the value of PFDavg.  Next, Table 13 is used to check the
maximum SIL that can be claimed given the hardware fault tolerance and the SFF.  For this
example, the maximum that can be claimed is SIL 3.  Therefore, no SIL constraints are imposed.
The system safety recommendations also address SIL constraints.  Section 6.6.4.11 of the system
safety recommendations [Sammarco and Fisher 2001] lists the minimum fault tolerances, as shown
in Table14 below:
Table 14.—Minimum fault tolerances
SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
Simple subsystem . . . . . . 0 0 1
Complex subsystem . . . . . 0 1 2
Table 14 is a rough approximation of Tables 12–13; Table 14 does not differentiate between the
subsystem type (A or B) and omits the use of SFF as a constraining factor.
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6.4.4 Example 5:  System Safety Recommendations – Hardware Architecture Constraints
This example is based on the 1oo2 PLC shown in Figure 9 as used in example 4; however, the SFF
is neglected.  The following parameters are known for the 1oo2 PLC:
PFDavg ' .2 × 10&7   (SIL 3)
Faults tolerated ' 1
Component type ' B
Table 14 is used for this example.  The maximum SIL that can be claimed, given a fault tolerance
of one, is SIL 2.  For this example, Table 14 is more restrictive than Table 13.
6.4.5 Exceptions
There are exceptions to the minimum fault tolerance constraints in Table 14.  Any one of these is
an exception, provided it is supported by documentation:
(1)  The subsystem is inherently safe due to the nature of its design and construction.
NOTE 23: A mechanical actuator linkage is an example.
(2)  The subsystem has a documented service history for similar applications and environments.
NOTE 24: An example is a 1oo1 PLC that had a documented service history of safety performance of SIL 2 for
longwall mining applications.
(3)  The SFF can be determined.
NOTE 25: If the SFF is known, then use the IEC 61508 architectural constraints for hardware safety integrity as listed
in Tables 12–13.
6.5 Safe Failure Fraction (SFF)
The SFF was briefly introduced in the previous example.  The SFF is a metric used for constraining
the maximum SIL that can be claimed regardless of the calculated hardware reliability.
Annex C of IEC 61508–6 [IEC 1998f] presents a sample calculation of the SFF where:
SFF ' (G8S % G8DD) / total failure rate 8total
8total ' G8S % G8D
G8D ' G8DD % G8DU
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Figure 12.—Failure classifications.
The SFF calculation assumes that a dangerous detected failure will be detected and mitigated to
bring the system to a safe state.
NOTE 26: A detailed analysis of 8S and 8D might not be practical for complex components.  These parameters can
be based on engineering judgment.  For a complex component, a 50/50 split of safe and dangerous failures is reasonable.
6.6 Failures
Hazards can occur from hardware or software failures.  Hardware failures are physical failures and
are usually due to random events and wear.  They can involve any of the system’s physical
components, including programmable electronic devices, power supplies, sensors, data
communication paths, actuators, etc.  Software does not exhibit random wearout failures.  Instead,
software failures result from systematic (functional) errors.  Figure 12 shows the two failure
classifications—physical and functional.
Figure 13 shows physical and functional failure distributions for PE-based mining system mishaps.
The data cover the period 1995–2001.  The population is 100 mishaps and is composed of mishap
data from MSHA; New South Wales, Australia; and Queensland, Australia.  Random failures exceed
systematic failures by about 7%.  Note that 15% of the failure sources were unknown.  This implies
that physical evidence of a failure (random failures) did not occur or was not observed.  One could
infer that these unknown failures may largely be unspecified systematic errors.
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Figure 13.—Random and systematic failure distributions for 100 PE-based mining system mishaps
during 1995–2001.
Figure 14.—Systematic failures for 100 PE-based system mishaps during 1995–2001.
6.6.1 Functional (Systematic) Failures
Systematic failures are also known as functional failures.  Sources of these failures include hardware
and software design errors, errors made during maintenance or repair, operator errors, and errors
resulting from software modifications.  Figure 14 shows the breakdown of systematic failures as
derived from the same data used to generate Figure 13.  Design errors comprised 50% of all
systematic failures, while failures during maintenance or repair comprised 40%.  Together, these two
categories comprised 90% of the systematic failures.
6.6.2 Physical (Random) Failures
The harsh environmental factors associated with mining, such as water and dirt intrusion, vibration,
shock, and heat, can seriously impact hardware failures.  The failures that occur involve electrical
connectors, wiring, sensors, power supplies, and solenoids.  One example of a random failure is the
degradation of rubber seals or boots used to keep out dust and moisture.  Figure 15 shows the
breakdown of random failures as derived from the same data used to generate Figure 13.  Sensor
failures comprised the largest category of random failures.  Switches are considered a sensor in this
analysis.
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Figure 15.—Random failures for 100 PE-based mining system mishaps during 1995–2001.
6.6.3 Physical (Random) Failure Rates
Multiple types of physical failures exist, and it is important to distinguish these types and their
associated rates for evaluating safety integrity levels.  The failures are broadly classified as safe
failures or dangerous failures.  A safe failure is also known as a nuisance failure, false-trip failure,
spurious failure, or fail-to-safe failure.  Typically, a safe failure results in some type of shutdown.
A dangerous failure occurs when the system cannot perform a safety function when it is needed.
Safe or dangerous failures can be detected or undetected; therefore, the failure rate consists of the
detected and undetected failures rates as follows:
•  Total failure rate 8 ' 8S % 8D
•  Total failure rate 8 ' 1/mean time between failure (MTBF)
•  Safe failure rate 8S ' 8SD % 8SU, where 8SD is safe detected and 8SU is safe undetected
•  Dangerous failure rate 8D ' 8DD % 8DU, where 8DD is dangerous detected and 8DU is dangerous
undetected
If diagnostics are not available to detect failures, then 8SD ' 0 and 8DD ' 0.
6.6.4 Failure Data
Failure data are needed to calculate PFDavg for low-demand applications and to calculate the
probability of a dangerous failure for high-demand applications.  There are limitations to failure
data.  Some databases only provide failure rates.  In this case, one can set conservative estimates
such as 50% of electronic component failures are safe, 75% of relay failures are safe, and 40% of
solenoid failures are safe.
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Failure rates are typically expressed on a yearly basis.  For instance, a single shutoff valve’s failure
rate could be expressed as .0018/year.  In addition to failure rates, the failure modes (safe and
dangerous) and the effectiveness of automatic diagnostics are needed.
6.6.5 Failure Data Sources
Numerous data sources exist.  Some databases are industry-specific, product-specific, generic, or
site-specific.  For instance, a site-specific database may contain failure rate and failure mode data
for solenoid valves used at a given mine.  Some databases are printed in book form; others are
available in electronic format.
Some common failure data sources are:
•  Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA) [SINTEF 1997]
•  Reliability Data for Control and Safety Systems [SINTEF 1989]
•  Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data [Reliability Analysis Center 1995]
•  Safety Equipment Reliability Handbook [exida.com 2003]
NOTE 27: This is a partial list of database sources and does not imply endorsement.  An extensive listing of failure
data sources is available at www.ntnu.no/ross/info/data.php [Norwegian University of Science and Technology 2005].
Databases can be an important source of failure data, but other sources exist.  For instance, some
PLC vendors can provide model-specific data.  Also, some software programs used to calculate
safety integrity levels have built-in databases that provide failure rate, failure mode, and diagnostic
capabilities for standard electronic and nonelectronic products.
6.7 Diagnostics
Not all failure modes are detectable through the use of diagnostics.  In addition, adding diagnostic
capabilities could be impractical to implement for some failure modes; therefore, a percentage of
failures are typically covered by diagnostics.  The term “diagnostic coverage” reflects this situation.
A method for calculating diagnostic coverage and a sample calculation is presented in annex C of
IEC 61508–6 [IEC 1998f].  Diagnostic coverage (DC) is calculated as follows:
DC ' G8DD / G8total
6.8 Common Cause
Common cause factors can exist when using multiple channels or redundancy.  Common cause
failures occur when a single failure causes other components to fail.  For instance, a system has three
analog sensors powered from the same electrical source.  Although there is redundancy, all three
sensors will fail if there is a failure with the electrical source.
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Figure 16.—A system abstracted to three components.
Common cause failures could result from a systematic fault such as human error, random hardware
failure, or a combination of systematic and random failures.
Annex D of IEC 61508–6 presents a methodology for quantifying common cause.  The methodology
uses a $-factor to model common cause failures [IEC 1998f].
6.9 SIL Verification
SIL verification depends on the calculation of PFD or dangerous failures per year.  The calculations
depend on:
•  Choice of technology
•  Mode of operation (low- or high-demand)
•  Architecture
•  Diagnostics
•  Systematic failures
•  Common-cause failures
•  Test interval
•  Prior service history (proven-in-use)
•  Maintenance
For SIL verification, it is useful to reduce the system to an abstraction of three parts:  a sensor (S),
a logic solver (L), and a final element (FE).  Figure 16 depicts this abstraction.
The sensor can be any type sensor such as a switch or pressure transducer.  The logic solver could
be a relay, solid-state device, or PLC.  In some systems, the sensor could be directly hard-wired to
the final element; thus, the logic solver is considered the connecting wire.  Some examples of final
elements include a solenoid valve or a motor starter.  The sensor and final element typically have
the highest hardware failure rates, so they are the weakest link in a system [Gruhn and Cheddie
1998].
The simple abstraction shown in Figure 16 is useful for verifying the SIL of a safety system with
a low-demand mode of operation.  For instance, the average probability of failure on demand
(PFDavg) of a system’s safety function for a low-demand system is calculated by:
PFDsys ' PFDS %  PFDL %  PFDFE (6)
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where  PFDS  ' PFDavg of a safety function for the sensor element,
 PFDL  ' PFDavg of a safety function for the logic solver,
and  PFDFE ' PFDavg of a safety function for the final element.
The SIL for a system will not be greater than the lowest SIL of its components.
6.9.1 Example 6:  A Simplified PFDavg Verification
A shutdown function is required to have a safety performance of SIL 2.  The first conceptual design
consists of a single pushbutton switch, PLC, and hydraulic pump contactor connected in series.  The
pump shuts down when the switch is pressed, thus placing the system to a safe state.  The PFDavg
of each device is given:
PFDS    ' PFDavg of the switch ' 1.10 × 10&2   (SIL 2)
PFDPLC ' PFDavg of the PLC ' 2.50 × 10&2   (SIL 2)
PFDFE  ' PFDavg of the pump motor contactor ' 2.19 × 10&3   (SIL 3)
Using equation 6, the PFDsys is calculated:
PFDsys ' (1.10 × 10&2) % (2.50 × 10&2) % (2.19 × 10&3)
PFDsys ' 3.82 × 10&2   (SIL 2)
The design is verified to meet SIL 2.  To increase the system SIL to 3, both SIL 2 components must
be changed to meet SIL 3.
6.9.2 Quantitative SIL Verification Techniques
Various techniques can be used to determine PFDavg for a low-demand operation and the probability
of dangerous failures for high-demand or continuous mode operation.  The following quantitative
techniques can be used for verifying that the safety integrity level is achieved:
• Reliability Block Diagram Technique.—Annex B of IEC 61508–6 gives examples to determine
the probability of hardware failures for low- and high-demand modes of operation [IEC 1998f].
The annex gives examples for 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 2oo3, and other architectures.
• Simplified Equations Technique.—The determination of the SIL via equations is detailed in
Parts 1 and 2 of the ISA Technical Report TR84.0.02 [ISA 1998a,b].  This document gives
procedures for PFDavg calculations and sample calculations for various architectures.  Equations
are given with terms for multiple failures during repair, common causes, and systematic errors.
Basic equations that drop these terms are also given as follows:
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1oo1                                                                                     (7)
1oo2 PFDavg ' ((8DU)2 × TI2) / 3 (8)
2oo2 PFDavg ' 8DU × TI (9)
2oo3 PFDavg ' (8DU)2 × TI2 (10)
where 8DU ' failure rate for dangerous undetected failures,
and TI ' manual test interval or frequency.
• Fault-tree Analysis Technique.—Part 3 of ISA Technical Report TR84.0.02 details the use of
fault trees [ISA 1998c].  The graphical nature of this technique affords visualization of failure
paths.  Fault trees can model diverse technologies and complex failure logic; however, they are
not well suited to model time dependencies.  Software programs are available for conducting
fault-tree analysis.
• Markov Modeling Technique.—Part 4 of ISA Technical Report TR84.0.02 details Markov
modeling [ISA 1998d].  All possible states can be modeled including fully operational, partially
failed (degraded) states, and failed states.  Markov models can also include repair and repair
rates of failed components.  Markov models are well suited for complex devices such as PLCs.
These models provide the most accurate analysis.  They are also the most mathematically
demanding techniques.
6.9.3 Example 7:  SIL Verification Using Simplified Equations
A switch is to be used as the sensor for the system shown in Figure 16.  This is a simplex system
(1oo1 architecture) that does not have diagnostics.  The switch needs to meet SIL 2.  Calculate the
switch SIL using equation 6 and the following parameters:
TI ' 8,760 hours or once per year
8DUswitch ' .4 × 10&5
PFDavg switch ' (0.4 × 10&5) (8,760 / 2) ' 1.8 × 10&2   (SIL 1)
The switch only meets an SIL 1.  The safety performance of the switch can be improved by using
a switch with a lower 8DU or by changing the manual test interval to once every 6 months.
Increasing the test frequency results in a safety performance that meets SIL 2.
PFDavg switch ' (0.4 × 10&5) (4,380 / 2) ' 8.8 × 10&3   (SIL 2)







6.9.4 Software Tools for SIL Verification
Calculations by hand can be appropriate for some situations such as initial estimations of PFD for
a simple system design where the target is an SIL 1 or SIL 2.  For these situations, the simplified
equations or reliability block diagram techniques can be used.  For other situations, software tools
are very useful for performing safety integrity analysis.
Some tools are specifically designed to perform quantitative safety integrity analysis as specified
by IEC 61508, IEC 61511, and ANSI/ISA 84.01.  In addition to PFD calculations, these tools can
calculate mean time to fail spurious (MTTFS).  Some tools integrate failure databases and can
accommodate various architectures.  Sophisticated Markov analysis can be used to quickly produce
highly accurate calculations without the end-user knowledge of Markov analysis.
These software tools also help document the analyses and the associated assumptions, failure rates,
manual test intervals, common cause factors, and diagnostic coverage.  The tools also provide
graphics that help users analyze and visualize the safety integrity contributions of sensors, logic
solvers, and field devices.  Some software tools have demonstration versions available for down-
loading.  Examples of software tools are:
•  CaSSPac www.landmengineering.com/software.html
•  FSC SafeCalc hpsweb.honeywell.com/Cultures/en-US
•  SilCore  www.acm.ab.ca/toolsSilCore.cfm
•  SILver www.exida.com/applications/silver.asp
NOTE 28: This list is for example purposes only and does not imply endorsement.
7.0 Management of Change (MOC)
MOC is important to reduce the potential for introducing new hazards or exacerbating existing ones.
One way to minimize this potential is to establish a systematic plan or process.
MOC must also apply to software because it is part of the system and modifications can adversely
impact safety.  Software modifications, as well as hardware modifications, must be analyzed for
hazards.  Those software modifications impacting safety should be well documented and managed.
A management of change process is shown in Figure 17.
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8.0 Lessons Learned
Past near-mishaps, accidents, and fatalities experienced in mining and other industries have provided
an opportunity to generalize some lessons learned.
(1) System and software requirements specifications
Most problems with safety-critical software come from safety requirement specification
errors where:
• The requirements specification is incorrect or incomplete.
• The implementation of the requirements specification is incorrect due to mis-
understandings and discrepancies.
(2) Mode changes
Mode changes can be a significant source of errors compromising safety.  Mode changes
include startup and shutdown.  Mining systems can have manual, semiautomatic, automatic,
and remote operational modes.  For example, an accident occurred when changing from
automatic to manual then back to automatic operation.  The system resumed operation from
the last state during automatic mode rather than from the last state from the manual mode.
This resulted in an unexpected machine movement, injuring the operator.
Figure 17.—Management of change (MOC) process.
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(3) Extreme conditions (boundary conditions)
Operation at extreme conditions or boundary points can be an area of potential high risks and
should be carefully evaluated; therefore, these points should be identified and tested.
Extreme conditions include physical conditions of temperature and moisture, electrical
conditions of low or high power, signal inputs and outputs from transducers, and physical
conditions of movement such as rate of change and range of movement.
(4) System changeovers
System changes from hardware to software should carefully be analyzed with respect to
safety.  For example, a simple, hard-wired hardware-based protection system was changed
to a PLC-based system.  Faults occurred because the new design was more complex, and the
design did not take into account new error sources associated with the technology.
9.0 Emergency Stop Function Case Study
A case study is presented in this section.  The purpose is to show how the recommendations can be
implemented by using a simplified example.  This example closely follows the safety life cycle.  The
example is for learning purposes only.  It does not detail every task or process given by the
recommendations; however, it does focus on the key concepts and processes.
One safety function, an emergency stop, is presented in this case study.  The example shows how
a system level safety analysis identifies the need for this safety function and how this safety function
is implemented throughout the safety life cycle phases.
9.1 Case Study Description
The case study concerns the design for 30 continuous mining (CM) machines.  These machines
operate underground to cut coal.  Each CM machine can be operated manually by a worker seated
in the operator’s compartment or by using a remote-control pendant that can be used in a wireless
mode or tethered to the CM machine.
The CM’s basic operation can be described in three steps, as shown in Figure 18:  (1) Coal is cut
with a rotating cutter drum that can be raised or lowered by controlling the position of a boom.
(2) The cut coal is collected into a gathering pan.  (3) The coal is transported from the gathering pan
to the end of the machine via a conveyor.
The cutting drum, gathering pan, tail conveyor, and traction motors are powered electrically.  The
boom position, as well as some other functions, is powered hydraulically.  Machine movements are
via left- and right-hand crawler tracks; each track is turned with a dedicated electric traction motor.
This enables the following machine movements:  forward, reverse, forward turn left or right, reverse
turn left or right, and pivot left or right.  Some of the control functions for the traction motors and
the cutting drum are implemented by an onboard industrial PLC.
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9.2 Safety Life Cycle Phases
The case study example follows the safety life cycle shown in Figure 19.  Each phase of the life
cycle is detailed in the recommendations for system safety [Sammarco and Fisher 2001].
9.3 Scope
The scope is limited to the operator and continuous mining machine.  Other support machinery and
personnel are excluded in order to simplify this example.  This example does not present all hazards
associated with operating and maintaining the machine.
9.4 System Hazard and Risk Analysis
The hazard and risk analysis is conducted at the system level for the entire continuous mining
machine.  Three hazard analysis techniques are used to identify system hazards:  checklists, HAZOP,
and FTA.  Next, the level of risk for each hazard is assigned by use of a risk matrix.  The assignment
of an SIL for each hazard is based on this risk matrix.
9.5 Hazard Analysis
Multiple hazard analysis techniques are used as detailed in the recommendations for system safety
[Sammarco and Fisher 2001].  The techniques used in this example are checklists, HAZOP,
and FTA.
Figure 18.—A continuous mining machine.
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Figure 19.—The safety life cycle.
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9.5.1 Checklists
Checklists can be used as a hazard analysis technique to identify hazards, to stimulate thinking, and
to pass on lessons learned from mistakes and experience.  They can also be used to systematically
list design procedures and practices, thus reducing the likelihood of errors of omission during the
design phase.  The following checklist items have been extracted from Appendix A of the system
safety recommendations [Sammarco and Fisher 2001].  The hazard associated with each checklist
item is also given.  Multiple checklist items can identify the same hazard.
System checklist:
Can a single-point failure cause a hazardous state?
• Response:  Yes, loss of machine control could happen if the PLC-based control system
failed.
• Hazard:  Loss of machine control
Can failure to turn on or turn off solenoids or activators cause an unsafe condition?
• Response:  Yes, loss of machine control could happen if the control system failed to safely
control solenoids or activators.  For example, the tram controls could be stuck in the
activated (“on”) state.
• Hazard:  Loss of machine control
Hardware checklist:
Can the failure of any input or output device cause an unsafe state?
• Response:  Yes, if a remote-control pendant tram switch failed in a stuck-on position, then
tramming could not be stopped.
• Hazard:  Loss of machine control
Will sticking or malfunctioning solenoid valves place the system in an unsafe state?
• Response:  Yes, a stuck valve could cause unexpected movement of a hydraulically con-
trolled function.
• Hazard:  Unexpected movement
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9.5.2 HAZOP
Two HAZOP data sheets are presented for the initial design phases of the machine.  The first
HAZOP data sheet (Table 15) lists the results of analyzing the pump motor of the hydraulic system.
The next HAZOP data sheet (Table 16) lists the results of analyzing the control PLC.  Both data
sheets are of a high-level HAZOP analysis.
Table 15.—HAZOP data sheet for hydraulic pump
HAZOP
SYSTEM                Continuous Miner              
SUBSYSTEM                  Hydraulics                
Team Leader:  Sammarco
Team Members:  Cole, Fries, Jobes




word Cause Consequence Remediation Remarks
1 Pump Hydraulic
pressure
No 1.  Hydraulic system
failure
2.  Pump motor failure
3.  Electric system
failure














More 1.  Hydraulic system
failure















Less 1.  Hydraulic system
failure











Table 16.—HAZOP data sheet for the PLC data line to control the tram functions
HAZOP
SYSTEM                Continuous Miner               
SUBSYSTEM      PLC-based control system    
HAZOP Method:       X    Deviation by deviation              Cause by cause
Team Leader:  Sammarco
Team Members:  Cole, Fries, Jobes











No 1.  PLC fails
2.  Severed wire













































Fault-tree analysis is a top-down approach that begins with the undesired outcome at the top of the
fault tree and ends with potential causes at the bottom.  This example takes the general hazards of
loss of machine control (i.e., the state of the mining machine cannot be changed) and unexpected
machine movement, and forms a more specific hazard—loss of tram control.  Figure 20 shows the
fault tree for this undesired outcome.  Six events (i.e., PLC fails, tram switch fails) are identified that
could lead to the undesired state of loss of tram control.  For instance, a low power supply voltage
(brown-out condition) for the PLC is a power failure that could cause code execution errors.
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Figure 20.—Fault tree for the loss of tram control hazardous event.
9.6 Risk Determination
The following hazards have been identified:
•  Hazard 1:  Loss of machine control
•  Hazard 2:  Unexpected machine movement
The risk assessment matrix (Table 10) is used to determine the level of risk for each hazard and the
associated SIL for a safety function to mitigate the hazard.  The parameters of severity and
frequency are needed to use the risk assessment matrix.  The severity is defined by the classifications
shown in Table 8; frequency is defined by the classifications in Table 9.
Both hazards could potentially cause a fatality if the machine movement pinned or crushed a miner;
therefore, the severity is “catastrophic” based on the severity categories in Table 8.  For example
purposes, the frequency for each hazard is about once every 2 years based on MSHA accident data
for similar machines; therefore, the frequency is classified as “probable” based on the frequency
categories in Table 9.  The risk for each hazard is unacceptable and assigned an SIL 3 based on the




H1 . . . . Loss of machine control . . . . . . . . . . . 3
H2 . . . . Unexpected machine movement . . . . 3
9.7 Safety Requirements
At this point, the hazards H1 and H2 have been identified and assessed as SIL 3.  The design
strategy is to provide an emergency stop safety function to mitigate these hazards.  The safety
function requirements are defined in terms of functional requirements and safety integrity
(performance) requirements.
9.7.1 Emergency Stop Function Safety Requirements
The safety requirements are specified in terms of functional and safety integrity requirements as
shown in Figure 4, “Overall Safety Requirements.”
9.7.1.1 Functional Requirements
Description:  The emergency stop function shall shut down the machine such that it stops movement
of the machine and all electrical or hydraulic driven devices on the machine.
Associated Hazard(s):
Loss of machine control.  Reference hazard H1 of the hazard and risk analyses.
Unplanned movements.  Reference hazard H2 of the hazard and risk analyses.
Default State:  Tripped (deenergized to the shutdown state).
Safe State(s):  Deenergized to trip to a safe state.
Triggering Event(s):  Manually pushing in the emergency stop switch shall trigger the emergency
stop function.
A single action shall trigger the emergency stop function (see NOTE 29).
Reset:  Manual reset of devices such as switches and circuit breakers.  No automatic resetting of this
safety function.
Human/Machine Interface:  The interface between the human and machine shall be via a
hermetically sealed, pushbutton-type switch.
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Human Factors:
The emergency stop function shall be readily accessible and clearly marked for its intended purpose
(see NOTE 29).
A large red button shall be used for invoking the emergency stop function.
Depressing the button shall trip the emergency stop.
The state of the emergency stop function shall be readily determined by visible inspection of the
pushbutton-type switch as follows (see NOTE 29):
•  The button is down for the duration of the tripped state.
•  The button is up during the operational state.
The emergency stop switch shall be clearly visible, yet physically protected from false trips caused
by accidental contact (see NOTE 29).
The button must be physically reset once the button is depressed.
Response Times:
The emergency stop function shall be completed within 500 milliseconds of its triggering.  This
includes the response time of the machine’s hydraulic and electrical control systems.
NOTE 29: These requirements are derived from the human factors checklist in Appendix A of the system safety
recommendations [Sammarco and Fisher 2001].
9.7.1.2 Safety Integrity Requirements:
Target SIL:  SIL 3
Diagnostic Requirements:  None
Test Requirements:
•  Manual test of the emergency stop function at least once per year
•  Manual test results should be documented
Constraints:  The nuisance trip rate MTTFS shall be less than once per year.
Performance:  The safety function demand is once per year (low-demand mode of operation).
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9.8 Designate the Safety-critical Areas
The objective of this phase is to assign safety functions to various PE-based and non-PE-based
safety systems.  The emergency stop function of this example is implemented using two different
design approaches.
The first approach assigns the safety function to a non-PE-based safety system.  The design uses a
dedicated hard-wired circuit; thus, two principles of safe design are followed:
(1)  Keep the design simple.
(2)  Physically and logically separate the safety and control functions.
The second approach assigns the safety function to an existing PE-based system that implements
some of the machine’s control functions; therefore, this design does not physically and logically
separate the safety function from the machine’s control functions.
9.9 Realization Process
The emergency stop function allows a worker to stop the machine in emergency situations.  The
design uses a pushbutton switch to trip the main line circuit breaker to the machine.  All electrical
power to the machine is interrupted, thus stopping the machine’s traction motors and hydraulic
pump.
Two examples are given for the dedicated hard-wired design.  The first example uses a generic
switch; the second increases the safety performance to SIL 3 by using redundant switches
specifically designed for emergency stop functions.
Two examples are given for the PLC-based design.  The first example uses an industrial PLC; the
second design increases the safety performance to SIL 3 by using a safety PLC.
NOTE 30: Realization requires that random and systematic errors be addressed.  Examples  8–11 only address random
failures for the system’s hardware components.  The examples do not address software or the performance of the human
operator.
NOTE 31: Examples 8–11 pertain to a safety function performance of SIL 3.  This does not imply that all safety
functions should be required to meet SIL 3.
NOTE 32: Examples 8–11 are not meant to imply that a human-initiated emergency stop system alone can meet the
examples’ SIL 3 safety requirement.
9.9.1 Example 8 (see NOTES 30–32):  Generic Switch-based Design
The design uses a generic switch directly wired to the main line circuit breaker, as shown in
Figure 21.  The design can be abstracted as a sensor, logic solver, and field device.  The switch is
the sensor; the logic solver is the wire; the field device is the circuit breaker.  This design is for
example purposes.  An alternate design would interrupt a pilot circuit instead of tripping a circuit
breaker.
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Figure 21.—Emergency stop system using a single, generic switch.
This is a simplex system (1oo1 architecture), so common cause is not considered.  None of the
components have diagnostics, so safe and dangerous failures are not detected.  The following
parameters are given:
MTTR ' 4 hours
Test interval (TI) ' once per year (8,760 hours)
Diagnostic coverage (DC) ' 0 (because diagnostics are not used)
Switch parameters:
Failure rate ' 1 × 10&6
20% of failures are safe (switch fails open) ' .20 × 10&6
80% of failures are dangerous (switch fails closed) ' .80 × 10&6
8DD ' 0
Normal state ' closed
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Wire parameters:
Failure rate  ' 1.1 × 10&8
90.9% of failures are safe (wire fails open) ' 1.0 × 10&8
9.1% of failures are dangerous (wire fails closed) ' .1 × 10&8
Circuit breaker (cb) parameters:
Failure rate ' 1.5 × 10&6
92% of failures are safe (circuit breaker fails open) ' 1.38 × 10&6
8% of failures are dangerous (circuit breaker fails closed) ' .12 × 10&6
9.9.1.1 SIL Verification
The SIL is verified by using the simplified equations to find the PFDavg of each component and of
the system.  The claimed SIL for each component is checked for architectural constraints listed in
Table 12.
PFDswitch ' 8DU × (TI / 2)
PFDswitch ' (0.80 × 10&6) × (8,760 / 2)
PFDswitch ' 3.5 × 10&3
PFDwire ' 8DU × (TI / 2)
PFDwire ' 4.38 × 10&6
PFDcb ' 8DU × (TI / 2)
PFDcb ' 5.2 × 10&4
PFDsystem ' PFDswitch % PFDwire % PFDcb
PFDsystem ' (3.5 × 10&3) % (4.38 × 10&6) % (5.2 × 10&4)
PFDsystem ' 4.02 × 10&3   (SIL 2)
At this point of the verification, the design using a generic pushbutton switch does not meet SIL 3.
It is pointless to continue the analysis to determine if any architectural constraints would apply (see
Table 12 for constraints).  The switch is a limiting component of the design because it only meets
SIL 2.  The safety performance can be improved by using a switch having a lower failure rate and
by adding fault tolerance.
9.9.2 Example 9 (see NOTES 30–32):  Redundant Emergency Stop Switch-based Design
The safety performance is increased by changing from a 1oo1 design to a design using a switch with
a lower dangerous failure rate and configured in a 1oo2 architecture, as depicted in Figure 22; thus,
the system can tolerate one fault.
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Figure 22.—Emergency stop system using lower failure rate switches.
Low failure rate switch parameters:
Failure rate ' 1 × 10&6
60% of failures are safe (switch fails open) ' .60 × 10&6
40% of failures are dangerous (switch fails closed) ' .40 × 10&6
8DD ' 0
9.9.2.1 SIL Verification
PFD1oo2 switch ' ((8DU)2 × TI2) / 3
PFD1oo2 switch ' ((.40 × 10&6)2 × (8,760)2) / 3
PFD1oo2 switch ' 4.1 × 10&6
The PFDavg for the wire and circuit breaker are unchanged from the previous example.
PFDwire ' 4.38 × 10&6
PFDcb ' 5.2 × 10&4
The PFDavg for the system is:
PFDsystem ' (4.1 × 10&6) % (4.38 × 10&6) % (5.2 × 10&4)
PFDsystem ' 5.29 × 10&4   (SIL 3)
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At this point of the verification the improved design meets SIL 3; however, the verification is not
completed because the system architecture restriction has not been taken into account.  Table 12 is
used for this purpose because the system is type A.
The SFF and fault tolerance are needed to determine the maximum SIL that can be claimed.  The
fault tolerance is one because of the 1oo2 switch architecture.  The SFF is calculated as follows:
SFF ' (G8S % G8DD) / (G8S % G8D)
G8S ' (.60 × 10&6) % (1.0 × 10&8) % (1.38 × 10&6) ' 1.99 × 10&6
G8D ' (.40 × 10&6) % (.10 × 10&8) % (.12 × 10&6) ' 5.21 × 10&7
G8DD ' 0 (because no diagnostics)
SFF ' .793, or 79.3%
The maximum SIL that can be claimed is SIL 3 using Table 12 with SFF ' 79.3% and a hardware
fault tolerance of one; therefore, the SIL is not constrained by the architecture.  Thus, this design is
verified to meet the target of SIL 3.
9.9.3 Example 10 (see NOTES 30–32):  An Industrial PLC-based Emergency Stop System
The design uses an existing PLC that provides control functions, as shown in Figure 23.  The first
conceptual design consists of a pushbutton switch, PLC, and hydraulic pump actuator connected in
series, as depicted in Figure 24.  In essence, the PLC is “shared” for control and safety functions.
This design does not follow the principle of independent safety and control functions.
The same switches and circuit breaker from the previous examples are used.  The following
parameters are typical for a generic, industrial PLC with built-in diagnostics:
Industrial PLC parameters:
Failure rate ' 3.8 × 10&6
55.6% of failures are safe ' 2.11 × 10&6
44.4% of failures are dangerous ' 1.69 × 10&6
Diagnostics can detect 50% of the safe failures
Diagnostics can detect 35% of the dangerous failures
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Figure 23.—A 1oo1 industrial PLC used for machine control.
Figure 24.—Conceptual diagram of a PLC-based safety system that shares a 1oo1 industrial PLC used for machine control.
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9.9.3.1 SIL Verification
The achieved SIL of this design is verified with the aid of the PC-based software tool FSC SafeCalc
(hpsweb.honeywell.com/Cultures/en-US).  The software tool performs the calculations of PFDavg
given the system architecture and parameters that are supplied by the user.  The following
parameters are used by the tool:
$ [%] The $-factor or common cause factor.  This factor is not applicable to 1oo1 or
     1oo1 architectures with diagnostics (1oo1D); therefore, the value “–” is shown.
Type A/B Component type A or B
8 [1/h] Failure rate (failures per hour)
MTTF [years] The mean time to fail (in years)
[%] Safe The percentage of component failures that result in a safe failure where:
    [%] Safe ' 8S / (8S % 8D)
NOTE 33: This parameter is similar to SFF.
DC Safe Diagnostic coverage for safe failures
DC Dangerous Diagnostic coverage for dangerous failures
MTTR [hour] Mean time to repair (in hours)
TI [months] Testing interval (in months)
The tool calculates PFDavg for each component and for the system, the SIL, risk and the architectural
constraints.  Figure 25 shows the results from the SIL tool.  The results show that when using this
PLC, the SIL ' 1 even though the design used the same 1oo2 switch redundancy and circuit breaker
of previous designs.  The limiting component with respect to SIL for the system is the industrial
PLC.  Increasing the redundancy of the switches or circuit breaker will not increase the system SIL.
Figure 25.—Results from an SIL tool verification of a 1oo2 switch and a 1oo1 industrial PLC.  This system meets SIL 1.
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The manual calculations of PFDavg for the switch and circuit breaker were done in example 9.  The
values are similar to those obtained by the SIL tool.  For instance, the manual calculation for the
circuit breaker was PFDcb ' 5.2 × 10&4, and the SIL tool calculation was PFDcb ' 5.25 × 10&4.  Using
the same formulas from example 9, the manual calculation for the PLC results in PFDplc ' 4.77 ×
10&3. The SIL tool results are more accurate because the equations used by example 9 are
approximations.
9.9.4 Example 11:  A Safety PLC-based Emergency Stop System
This design example changes the industrial PLC to a safety PLC that is certified to SIL 3.  Figure 26
shows the results from the SIL tool.  The results show that when using a safety PLC, the SIL ' 3.
Therefore, by adding one safety function to the industrial PLC used for control, the entire industrial
PLC must be replaced with a more costly safety PLC certified to SIL 3 even though the industrial
PLC was sufficient for control.
9.9.5 Limitations
The realization phase thus far has addressed the hardware component of the design; however, the
realization phase has not been completed because software and human performance have not been
addressed.
Human performance is critical for examples 8–11 because the human is a part of the system;
the human must initiate the emergency stop.  The human element poses significant limitations.  For
instance, a human might not recognize the need to activate the emergency stop function.  Also, there
are situations in which the human might not be able to physically reach the emergency stop in time.
Human reliability analysis is used to determine human errors such that it can be factored into
quantitative SIL verification.  Generally, the PFDavg ' 1 × 10&1 for human actions; thus, the human
operator marginally achieves SIL 1.
It is apparent that the human-activated emergency stop system needs to be combined with additional
layers of protection.  For example, an independent external watchdog timer circuit that automatically
monitors the safety PLC could be used as a second-layer protection.
Figure 26.—Results from an SIL tool verification of a 1oo2 system with a safety PLC.  This system meets SIL 3.
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APPENDIX A.—INFORMATION RESOURCES
Use of specific names is for identification purposes only and does not imply endorsement by the
National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety.
Commercial Sources for Standards
Document Center, Inc.
111 Industrial Rd., Suite 9
Belmont, CA  94002




15 Inverness Way East
Englewood, CO  80112–5704




Rochester, NY  14613
Phone:  1–800–876–4636
777 East Eisenhower Parkway
Ann Arbor, MI  48108
Phone:  800–699–9277
www.techstreet.com
Internet Sites for Standards Organizations
ANSI Home Page
www.ansi.org
National Standards Systems Network (NSSN) Directory of Standards
www.nssn.org
The IEEE Home Page
www.ieee.org
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U.S. Department of Defense military standards pertaining to software
tecnet0.jcte.jcs.mil/htdocs/dodinfo/index.html
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
www.iso.ch
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL)
www.ul.com
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
www.iec.ch
Safety-related Internet Sites
The American Society of Safety Engineers
www.asse.org








The System Safety Society, Inc.
www.system-safety.org
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ReadySET template/checklist system for system design requirements
readyset.tigris.org
www.readysetpro.com
The IEC 61508 Functional Safety Zone
www.iec.ch/zone/fsafety
The Motor Industry Software Reliability Association (MISRA)
www.misra.org.uk/index.htm
Organization Acronyms
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Phone:  202–646–7463, fax:  202–646–7508
ANSI American National Standards Institute
Phone:  212–642–4900, fax:  212–302–1286
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Phone:  212–705–7722, fax:  212–705–7437 or 212–980–4681
ATA Air Transport Association of America
Phone:  202–626–4000
BCS British Computer Society
Contact:  Ian Jones, e-mail:  ijones@bcs.org.uk
DIN German Institute for Standardization
Phone:  (4930) 2601–0
EIA Electronic Industries Association
Phone:  800–854–7179
HSE Health and Safety Executive, U.K.
Phone:  (0742) 752539
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
Phone:  022–734–0150
IEE Institution of Electrical Engineers, U.K.
Phone:  +44 (0) 1438 313311, fax:  +44 (0) 1438 313465
e-mail:  webmaster@iee.org.uk, gopher.iee.org.uk
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IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
Phone:  212–705–7900, fax:  212–752–4929
ISA The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society
Phone:  919–549–8411, fax:  919–549–8288
ISO International Organization for Standardization
MIL–STD Military Standard, U.S.
MSHA Mine Safety and Health Administration, U.S.
MOD Ministry of Defense, U.K.
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association
Phone:  202–457–8400
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S.
RAC Reliability Analysis Center
rac.alionscience.com
Phone:  888–RAC–USER; fax:  315–337–9932
RIA Robotics Industry Association
Phone:  313–994–6088; fax:  313–994–3338
UL Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
Phone:  847–272–8800
70
APPENDIX B.—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs)
The following questions were asked during NIOSH-MSHA Best Practice Recommendations
workshops in the United States and during two similar workshops given in Australia.
• If a system is reliable, does that mean it is also safe?
Often, safety and reliability are incorrectly equated in the sense that if a system is reliable, then it
is safe.  Reliability alone is not sufficient for safety.  For example, a reliable system could have
unsafe functions and conditions, or it could neglect to provide all the necessary safety functions.
The result is a reliably unsafe system!  Also, reliability is concerned with random failures; however,
failures are not always needed to cause an unsafe condition.  Safety is concerned with systematic
and random failures and events that impact safety.
Safety is “freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, or
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment [U.S. Department of
Defense 1993].”  Reliability is “the probability that a piece of equipment or component will perform
its intended function satisfactorily for a prescribed time and under stipulated environmental
conditions” [Leveson 1995].  Thus, a system could be reliable but unsafe, or a system could be safe
but unreliable.
• What is a system?
One of the first steps of a safety analysis is to define the system.  A clear definition of the system
is required so that hazards are not omitted from safety analyses.  This document defines a system
as:
A set of elements that interact according to a design, where an element of a system can be another
system, called a subsystem, which may be a controlling system or a controlled system and may
include hardware, software, and human interaction.  Hardware, software, and humans can be system
elements.
Hawkins [1993] presents the SHEL model of a system.  The SHEL model is composed of
(S)oftware, (H)ardware, (E)nvironment, and (L)iveware or humans (see Figure B–1).  The SHEL
model of a system is consistent with our definition of a system.
Figure B–1.—The SHEL model of a system.
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• What is the system safety approach?
System safety, as defined by MIL–STD–882C is “the application of engineering and management
principles, criteria, and techniques to achieve acceptable risk, within the constraints of operational
effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle” [U.S. Department of
Defense 1993].  System safety received much scientific attention during and after World War II.
This was the time when most of our traditional safety techniques were developed to address new
challenges posed by systems that were more complex due to the use of new technology [Leveson
1995].  The traditional “fly-fix-fly” approach to safety did not work well with these complex
systems.  It was too dangerous, costly, and wasteful to continue with this “after-the-fact approach,”
so the system safety concept was initiated as a “before-the-fact” process.  The key system safety
concepts are:
(1)  Integrating safety into the design
(2)  Systematic hazard identification and analysis
(3)  Addressing the entire system in addition to the subsystems and components
(4)  Using qualitative and quantitative approaches
The system safety process is documented in MIL–STD–882, the most widely known safety standard.
Existing safety standards are built upon collections of expertise and experiences (lessons learned)
involving fatalities, injuries, and near-misses.  In general, standards also provide uniform, systematic
approaches.  History has shown standards are effective tools for safety.
A common thread among the standards is hazard management; it is core to the system safety
approach.  The system safety approach includes a combination of managerial and technical tasks to
identify and evaluate hazards and to eliminate, reduce, and control hazards through analysis, design,
and management procedures.
• Why use the safety life cycle?
The use of a safety life cycle is required to ensure that safety is applied in a systematic,
comprehensive manner, thus reducing the potential for systematic errors.  The safety life cycle
concept is applied during the entire life of the system.  Hazards can become evident at later stages,
or new hazards can be introduced by system modifications.  Table 1 of this document lists the safety
life cycle phases.
The safety life cycle must be integrated within the overall product development life cycle because
safety issues impact overall development issues and vice versa.  Secondly, an integrated approach
minimizes the likelihood of addressing safety as an afterthought of the system design.
• Do faults, errors, and failures all refer to the same concept?
There is much confusion about faults, errors, and failures.  Often the terms are used interchangeably.
The relationship between a fault, error, and failure is shown in Figure B–2.  The following
discussion serves to clarify the terminology.
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A failure is the termination of the ability to perform an intended function.  This definition is based
on a performance of a function, so failure is a behavior occurring at an instance of time.  A fault is
an abnormal condition.  Faults are random (hardware) or systematic (hardware or software).
Random faults are due to physical wearout, degradation, or defects; they can be accurately predicted
and quantified.  Systematic faults pertain to the specification, design, and implementation and are
unpredictable.  Therefore, software faults are systematic.  Faults, both random and systematic, may
lead to errors.
An error is a system state that has the potential to lead to a failure.  When a fault results in an error,
the error is then a manifestation of the fault and the fault becomes apparent.  Not all faults lead to
errors or failures.  Some faults are benign or are tolerated such that failure does not occur.  Some
faults are dormant such that an error state or failure does not occur because the proper conditions
do not exist.  For example, a fault could reside in a section of software.  If that section of software
is not used, then neither an error state nor failure will exist.
• Are complex designs required for safety?
Simplification is one of the most important design aspects for safety.  Complexity makes it more
difficult to conceptualize, understand, specify, design, test, document, maintain, modify, and review
the system.  Complexity also makes it more likely for errors, failure, and unplanned interactions that
may cause unsafe conditions.  In addition, it increases demands on humans to operate and maintain
the system.  As a result, humans can unknowingly put the system in an unsafe state during operation
or maintenance.
• How does software contribute to complexity?
Software is especially prone to complexity because it can be nondeterministic, contain numerous
branches and interrupts, contain temporal criticality, and consist of hundreds of thousands of lines
of code.  Software does not exhibit random wearout failures.  Instead, software failures result from











Table B–2.—Fault, error, and failure relationship.
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Beizer [1990] gives an example illustrating an aspect of software complexity concerning the number
of paths for a section of code.  Given that a section of software has 2 loops, 4 branches, and 8 states,
Beizer calculates the number of paths through this code to exceed 8,000.
• Should the entire set of NIOSH recommendations be applied to every
programable electronic system?
The recommendations have limited or no applicability as follows:
No applicability:
•  Low-complexity systems
Limited applicability:
•  Systems, subsystems, and components with a safe proven-in-use history
•  Low-risk systems
First, the recommendations do not apply to low-complexity.  The system safety recommendations
in section 1.5.1 address low-complexity systems as follows [Sammarco and Fisher 2001]:
These recommendations do not apply to low-complexity systems satisfying these criteria:
(1) The failure modes of the system, all subsystems, and components are well defined and
understood.
(2) The system’s behavior under all fault conditions can be completely understood.
Secondly, limited applicability depends on the safe service history and the level of risk.  Systems,
subsystems, and components having a proven and documented safe history of service, but lacking
formal and rigorous verification, can be used without following all of the recommendations.
Sections 8.0 to 8.9 of the Independent Functional Safety Assessment recommendations address the
proven-in-use concept [Sammarco and Fries 2003].  Limited applicability of the recommendations
depends on the risk level.  The number of recommendation processes decreases as the risk decreases.
For example, Table 2 of the Software Safety recommendations [Fries et al. 2001] lists the software
verification and validation (V&V) methods recommended for a low-, medium-, and high-risk
software.  The recommended V&V methods for low-risk are about 65% fewer than those for
high-risk.
Lastly, as an example, the recommendations have limited or no applicability for some systems in
the stone industry because these systems have a safe proven-in-use service history or they are low-
complexity systems.  Our recommendations account for both situations.  However, a machinery
fatality that occurred in 1997 at Yakima Pre-Mix #6 (a sand and gravel wash plant in Yakima, WA)
serves as an example for using the complete set of recommendations.  The fatality occurred when
the blade mill in which a mechanic/repairman was working started up.  The MSHA accident
investigation report [Harsh and Pederson 1997] states:  “A contributing factor was the mis-
programming of the programmable logic controller, which permitted equipment to be inadvertently
energized without warning.”
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APPENDIX C.—SAMPLE FORMS FOR HAZARD ANALYSIS
The forms in this appendix serve as examples.  These forms can be adapted to create customized




1.  Submitted by: Date
2.  Equipment/device name:
3.  Customer name:
4.  Proposed change:
5.  Reason(s) for change:
6.  Identify item(s) to change:
7.  Safety/permissibility impact analysis results:




1.  Submitted by:                                                                      Date
2.  Equipment/Device Name:
3.  Customer Name:
4.  Hazard Description:
5.  Initial mishap risk index class:   A ___, B ___, C ___, D ___
6.  Source of hazard discovery:
7.  Hazard cause(s):
8.  Action(s) to eliminate or control hazard:




10.  Final mishap risk index class:   A ___, B ___, C ___, D ___
11.  Hazard closure approval by:                                                                   Date                             
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Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
SYSTEM                                                DATE                                        
SUBSYSTEM                                        SHEET                      of                   
COMPILED BY
VERIFIED BY





SYSTEM                                                                                     DATE                                         
SUBSYSTEM                                                                           
Team Leader:
Team Members:
Item Part Attribute Guideword Cause Consequence Remediation Remarks
Delivering on the Nation’s promise:
Safety and health at work for all people
through research and prevention





SAFER • HEALTHIER • PEOPLETM
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005–150
